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ARE WE ALL NOMINALISTS 
NOW? 
 
JUSTICE MICHAEL KIRBY * 
 
[Justice Michael Kirby, a judge of the High Court of Australia, sets out to explain 
the inescapably creative role involved in the work of the court in giving meaning to 
ambiguous constitutional and statutory words and common law concepts.  Unin-
formed commentators might call judges performing such functions as "nominal-
ists".  But few, if any, Australian judges now adhere to constitutional interpretation 
according to notions of original intent.  A "functional" approach is taken.  This 
approach is illustrated by reference to recent cases on the word "alien" and the 
phrase "trial by jury" in the Australian Constitution.  According to the author this is 
not a weakness but a strength of constitutional elaboration.  Judges and lawyers, 
being concerned about justice under law, are never "on automatic pilot".] 
 
 
I LAW AND JUSTICE:  MIND AND HEART 
 
It was a very nostalgic walk for me down from the new Commonwealth Law Courts 
to this place. I walked along William Street past the Supreme Court, where last 
October the High Court had its Centenary sitting in the Banco Court.  A hundred 
years earlier, exactly to the minute, the first sitting of the High Court of Australia 
had happened there.1  I then turned to the left and walked down Little Bourke 
Street. I walked past 451 Little Bourke Street, which at the time of my first judicial 
appointment in December 1974 was the venue of the Australian Conciliation and 
Arbitration Commission to which I was appointed.  It is now a much jazzier build-
ing.  In those days it was a rather decrepit, Formica type building, if you understand 
                                                        
*
  Justice of the High Court of Australia. Inaugural Speech, The Justice Speeches, La Trobe University 
Law Students’ Association, 30th April 2004, held at the Leo Cussen Institute, Melbourne. The ex tempore 
character of these remarks has been preserved. 
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  See ‘High Court Centenary’ (2003) 77 Australian Law Journal 653, 783. 
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my drift.  I walked then on and past what was, at that stage, the old High Court of 
Australia building on my left.  And down here to the Leo Cussen Institute. It is 
thirty years since I was first given the title of Justice.  I am the second longest 
serving Justice in our country.  The longest serving is Justice Kemeri Murray of the 
Family Court of Australia.  I have threatened to poison her so that I would be num-
ber one.   
 
It’s an excellent initiative of the Law Students’ Association to launch this series.  I 
hope it will stimulate ideas of justice in your minds and in your hearts.  We are 
called to a vocation that is not a purely mechanical one.  It is very important to 
understand that.  We are not simply on automatic pilot. Never.  We are not simply 
applying unquestioned rules, which don’t involve any input from ourselves.  Our 
input, when it comes, must come from a combination of our mind and our heart.  
That is how it has been for 800 years of the Common Law.  It will be so throughout 
your lifetime.  You will have to make a contribution to it.  Law and Justice are a 
product of mind and heart. 
 
II ENTER THE NOMINALISTS 
 
On Tuesday of this week the High Court was sitting in Canberra.  It is a particularly 
beautiful time of the year in the national capital.  All the trees are changing colour.  
My chambers are on the back, or the front, of the High Court, depending on 
whether you regard the lake as the front.  I look over Parliament House.  My cham-
bers have a magnificent sweep of the Brindabellas and of all of the beautiful build-
ings of Canberra: of the old Parliament House and the new Parliament; of the 
administrative buildings. I see from the constitutional triangle not only the lovely 
trees and the nature which is the glory of Canberra but also the seat of government 
of our country. The High Court of Australia is placed there in the constitutional 
triangle together with the executive government and the Parliament.  We are the 
symbols of the highest reach of government in Australia.   
 
I was sitting there preparing for the hearing of quite a complicated case.  My mind 
was totally absorbed in the detail of the case.  Into the room burst Justice McHugh.  
His eyes were bright and fiery.  He looked at me and he said, ‘Do you know that 
you and I have been called nominalists?’  I sat for a moment stunned.  That was a 
mistake. In the law, you must never let anyone know that you are stunned.  You 
must always be ready to seize the moment and to show that you know exactly what 
is happening around you.  I have been called many things in my lifetime.  But 
‘nominalist’.  What was a ‘nominalist’?  He said ‘You and I have been called nomi-
nalists’.  The blood drained from my face as I contemplated what on earth a nomi-
nalist could be. I rushed into the High Court reading room, which is adjacent to my 
chambers.  Trembling, I picked up The Australian newspaper.  The article in The 
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Australian called ‘Pink Picket Fence’2 contains a report of a submission presented 
to the federal government concerning the law of marriage.  The submission was 
drafted by the Australian Family Association.  In the article its spokesman, Richard 
Egan, said, in effect, ‘We need amendments to the Marriage Act because of the 
‘nominalists.’’.  This is what was reported: 
Egan accused nominalists such as High Court Justices Michael McHugh 
and Michael Kirby and the Justices of the Supreme Court of Ontario in 
Canada and Massachusetts in the United States of being Humpty Dump-
ties who assign marriage no fixed meaning.  They say that using their raw 
judicial power they can, like Humpty Dumpty, simply declare that two 
men can marry each other or two women may marry each other.  Mar-
riage, they say, is not a given reality but a fluid concept that can expand, 
stretch or redefine as we please.3 
 
In the immortal words of Vladimir Ilich Lenin, said Mr Egan, quoting the great 
revolutionary, ‘What is to be done?’ 
So I sat reading The Australian, in silence. I had to sit down because, as you appre-
ciate, I didn’t know what was coming. I then composed myself and thought: are we 
truly nominalists?  Is Justice McHugh sharing with me ‘nominalism’?  So I thought 
I should share with you this theory, that is, Mr Egan’s theory.  Perhaps I should 
explore it a little in these remarks. 
Immediately I knew what Mr Egan was getting at.  His reference was to the great 
case of Re Wakim.4  That was the case that undid the cross vesting legislation so far 
as it purported to permit State Parliaments to confer State jurisdiction on Federal 
courts.  In describing the theory of constitutional interpretation in the High Court, 
Justice McHugh responded, in Wakim, to some humble remarks I had made in my 
solitary dissent in that case.  I there suggested that the interpretation of the Austra-
lian Constitution adopted by the majority was neither necessary nor correct.5  In his 
reasons Justice McHugh explored, in a very important and very interesting and 
typically well written passage, how courts and especially the High Court of Austra-
lia, go about interpreting the sparse language of our constitutional text.  This is what 
he said.  Obviously it is what provoked Mr Egan: 
… [M]any words and phrases of the Constitution are expressed at 
such a level of generality that the most sensible conclusion to be 
drawn from their use in a constitution is that the makers of the Con-
stitution intended that they should have been able to apply to what-
ever facts and circumstances succeeding generations thought they 
covered.  Examples can be found in the powers conferred on the 
Parliament of the Commonwealth to make laws with respect to 
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3
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  Ibid 596 [178] ff. 
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‘trade and commerce’ with other countries and among the States or 
‘external affairs’ or ‘conciliation and arbitration for the prevention 
of settlement of industrial disputes.’  In these and other cases the 
test is simply what do these words mean to us as late twentieth cen-
tury Australians? … The level of abstraction for some terms of the 
Constitution is however much harder to identify than that of those 
set out up above.  Thus, in 1901, “marriage” was seen as meaning a 
voluntary union for life between one man and one woman to the 
exclusion of all others.  If that level of abstraction were now ac-
cepted it would deny the Parliament of the Commonwealth the 
power to legislate for same sex marriages, although arguably “mar-
riage” now means or in the near future may mean, a voluntary un-
ion for life between two people to the exclusion of others.6 
 
This is clearly the passage which caused Mr Egan to think that Justice McHugh was 
a ‘nominalist’.  Of course in the High Court of Australia we have not to this time 
had to consider what ‘marriage’ in the marriage power means.7 This is because 
there has not been a case which has presented that matter to the Court. I am not in 
these remarks going to embark upon what I think it may mean.  This is because I 
have not had the advantage of the arguments of the lawyers and the consideration of 
the hard facts of a case that will concretise the issue. 
However, in a talk I gave at Melbourne University on the subject of methods of 
constitutional interpretation, I referred to Justice McHugh’s remarks in the decision 
in Wakim.8 I said that his remarks indicated, in a very vivid way, how words can 
take on a different meaning.  The words remain the same. But over the passage of 
time (leave aside ‘marriage’ for the present purposes) words can take up a different 
meaning. Courts, giving meaning to the words which the Constitution requires in a 
contemporary case, have to focus on the word.  However, the judges must also keep 
in mind that a word can acquire a change in content - new nuances of meaning 
derived from the changing social context in which the word is used.  That is the 
genius of words at least in the English language. It presents the phenomenon of 
constitutional interpretation.   
So I sat there distracted from my labours in the case at hand and thought how many 
others on the High Court are ‘nominalists’? Are there no ‘originalists’ left who take 
the view that the words of the Australian Constitution are set in stone?  That the 
meaning of the words is to be found, and found only, by reference to what those 
words meant in 1900 when the Constitution as adopted by the Imperial Parliament?9  
Or in 1901 when it came into force in Australia?  What is the answer to that ques-
tion? 
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III THE CONSTITUTIONAL WORD ‘ALIENS’ 
 
Into my mind came flooding case after case in the matters that have been decided in 
the High Court in the eight years since I was appointed, in which Court has had to 
look at a word or a little phrase and to give it a meaning.  Often, the Court has come 
to conclusions that, almost certainly, were not the conclusions about the meaning of 
the word that would have been taken in 1900 or 190110 
Take for example the decision in Re Patterson; ex parte Taylor.11  It is a decision 
given in 2001.  So it is quite a recent decision.  That was a case about Mr Taylor 
who had come to Australia at the age of six. He had migrated from Britain with his 
parents.  He came on the Assistant Migrant Scheme at that time.  He was a British 
subject, as we all were in Australia at that time.  He didn’t take out Australian 
citizenship.  The overwhelming majority of people who came to Australia from the 
United Kingdom at that time did not take out Australian citizenship.  This was 
because they did not think it was necessary to go along to a ceremony and swear 
allegiance to the Queen, given that they already owed that allegiance.  Therefore, 
citizenship was not something that they thought was essential in their case, however 
much it might be essential or desirable in the case of people who came from other 
less fortunate lands outside British dominion. 
Mr Taylor with his family lived here from his sixth year for several decades.  At a 
certain time, I think he was by this time in his thirties, he committed criminal of-
fences.  The Minister for Immigration decided to revoke his ‘visa’ and to expel him 
from Australia.  Mr Taylor had no family in the United Kingdom.  He had no con-
nection with the United Kingdom.  He had never been to the United Kingdom since 
he had arrived to Australia at the age of 6.  Indeed, he had never left this country 
since the age of 6.  He came to the High Court of Australia and said to the Minister:  
‘You cannot expel me because I may not be an Australian citizen but I am an Aus-
tralian national.  I am a subject of the Queen.  In that capacity I am not an “alien.”12  
My period of “migration” has long since expired.13  You cannot deal with me as a 
migrant or an alien and therefore you cannot expel me.’ The basic issue was pre-
sented to the High Court in the case of Ex parte Taylor as to what the little word 
‘alien’ in the Australian Constitution meant.   
In a case of Nolan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs,14 more than a 
decade earlier, the High Court by majority, with Justice Gaudron alone dissenting, 
held that ‘alien’ in today’s world effectively meant non-citizen.  If that determina-
tion was correct, then the Minister had the entitlement to expel Mr Taylor from 
Australia.  In Nolan, Justice Gaudron said the word ‘citizen’ does not appear, rele-
vant to nationality, in the Australian Constitution.15  It is a statutory expression.  It 
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is not a constitutional notion.  Therefore, you cannot expel Mr Taylor as a ‘non-
citizen.’ You have got to consider whether you have the power in the Australian 
Constitution in respect to his nationality.   
When Mr Taylor’s case came before the High Court, four of the judges in the case, 
Justices Gaudron, McHugh and Callinan and I held that the arguments of Mr Taylor 
were correct.  We had slightly different reasons for explaining when British nation-
ality had ceased.  However, the majority were all convinced that the notion of 
‘alien’, from the beginning of the Australian Constitution and right up to quite 
recent times, meant in the case that British subjects who were non citizens could 
still have Australian nationality.  They could not be expelled as aliens.16  
There was then a change in the composition of the High Court of Australia.  Justice 
Gaudron retired. Justice Heydon took her place.  The issue came back to the Court 
because the Minister was not very happy with the decision in Taylor.  It came back 
to the Court in the case of Shaw v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural 
Affairs17 with Justice Heydon replacing Justice Gaudron.  That case was decided 
late last year.  
That case effectively amounted to a very rapid challenge, just two years after Tay-
lor, to the decision in Taylor.  It was an attempt to restore the ‘true’ doctrine, as it 
was put, that had been expressed in Nolan. Justices McHugh, Callinan and I didn’t 
shift our positions.  Nor did Chief Justice Gleeson or Justice Gummow and Justice 
Hayne shift their contrary positions. So it was 3:3.  It was up to Justice Heydon to 
deliver the decisive opinion.  And when Justice Heydon’s opinion came in, it was a 
very brief one you’ll be pleased to hear.18  However, it endorsed the view favoured 
by Chief Justice Gleeson, Justice Gummow and Justice Hayne in Taylor. 
The result was that a meaning was given to the constitutional word ‘alien.’ By 
majority, ‘alien’ meant, effectively in this day in age, ‘non citizen.’  This was so 
although citizenship is not referred to in the Australian Constitution as one of the 
powers for the enactment of laws by the Federal Parliament.  It is a statutory not a 
constitutional word.  
There are too many references to ‘subject of the Queen’ in the Australian Constitu-
tion19 for there to be any doubt that in 1900 the framers of the Constitution would 
have rejected with a scoff the notion that ‘alien’ included a subject of the Queen 
who was born in the United Kingdom within the allegiance of the Queen, and came 
to this country at the age of six and lived here all his life.  In 1900, without any 
shadow of a doubt, neither Mr Taylor nor Mr Shaw would have been ‘aliens.’ 
It is interesting to look at the qualifications for Members of the Federal Parliament.  
There is no mention there of their having to be Australian ‘citizens.’  The reference 
in the Australian Constitution is only to their having to be a ‘subject of the 
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Queen.’20 Put simply, that was the nationality status in 1900. So when the Court 
looked at the word ‘alien’ today, the issue was how we should interpret it. The 
majority of the court in Shaw’s case held that it didn’t mean the opposite of ‘subject 
of the Queen.’ At least it did not mean that in terms of the Queen in right of the 
United Kingdom.  It meant effectively, in today’s terms, ‘non citizen.’  
So there stands the debate in that case. An awful thought came across my mind as I 
sat there in the High Court reading room.  Perhaps Chief Justice Gleeson, Justice 
Gummow, Justice Hayne and Justice Heydon are ‘nominalists.’ Perhaps they are 
judges who believe that the word ‘alien’ has a shifting meaning.  They can give a 
different meaning to the anchor in the text and the meaning of 1900. They effec-
tively acknowledged a shift in meaning. I shook my head and thought that surely 
cannot be. Can they be ‘nominalists’ too?  Surely not. But then I reflected on the 
cases about jury trial.  
IV THE CONSTITUTIONAL PHRASE: TRIAL ‘BY JURY’ 
 
You will remember that there is that small, pathetic, almost unnoticed provision in 
Section 80 of the Australian Constitution, which says that in trials of indictable 
offences in federal cases, those trials have to be held ‘by jury.’  However, the guar-
antee might just as well not be in the Constitution because the High Court has given 
meaning to the words ‘on indictment’ as connoting anything that, by the procedures 
of the time, is an ‘indictable’ offence.21 Presumably, if the law does not require the 
matter to be proceeded with on ‘indictment,’ any case can proceed in a summary 
way without an indictment. Then it doesn’t pick up the right to trial ‘by jury.’ 
This is a view of the interpretation of the Constitution that I don’t agree with.  
However, in respect of Section 80, it is pretty well established in the constitutional 
doctrine of the High Court.  Despite that, over the last four or five years, in my time 
on the Court, we’ve had case after case where issues have been presented, about 
what that little expression ‘by jury’ means in Section 80.22 
One case came before my time on the Court in the case of Cheatle v Queen.23  It 
concerned whether or not you could have trial ‘by jury’ with majority verdicts. In 
most of the States of Australia, the Jury Acts have been amended to permit, in 
certain circumstances, majority verdicts. If there is one juror holding out, you can 
take the verdict from the 11. Or, in some cases, if there are two jurors holding out 
you can take the verdict from 10. Mr Cheatle was convicted by jury in South Aus-
tralia on a majority verdict.  Because in that case the conviction occurred in a fed-
eral trial, of a federal offence in federal jurisdiction, the courts applied, through the 
Judiciary Act, the procedural laws of the State.24  The judge accepted a majority 
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  (1993) 177 CLR 541. 
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verdict.  But Mr Cheatle challenged that course in the High Court.  He said, ‘by 
jury’ meant ‘by a process that is well entrenched in the Constitution.’  He threw in 
for good measure, ‘by the meaning of a jury trial in 1901’. So the case came up to 
the High Court.   
The court held that an essential notion of jury trial is unanimity. It’s essential be-
cause that is what had always been required of jury trials in England.  It was re-
quired long before Australia was settled and then in every jury trial in colonial 
times up to the adoption of the Federal Constitution. So what was involved was 
simply discovering and applying the meaning of the words, ‘by jury.’  
The High Court had a bit of a problem here.  This was because, if the issue of what 
those words meant had to be determined only by reference to the meaning of jury 
trial in 1900, it was the law at that time that to be a member of a jury in every 
colony of Australia, you had to have two qualities. You had to be of the male gen-
der.  And the other requirement was that you had to own some property. If you 
didn’t have the property but were of the male gender you couldn’t serve.  If you 
were of the male gender and didn’t have the property you couldn’t serve.  If you 
were a female you just couldn’t serve as a juror at all. You could be a very wealthy 
female, but you were not entrusted with serving on juries.  
And so it was in Cheatle that the Court held that unanimity was essential for jury 
trial. They held that on the basis that, that was what was required in the Common 
Law and in the Court’s practice up to the Australian Constitution. But the Court 
went on to say that there were some features of jury trial at the time when the Aus-
tralian Constitution was adopted that had not been carried into the constitutional 
meaning today, such as the male gender or property qualifications.25 Since Cheatle 
was decided, one after another we have had cases in which the question has arisen 
as to whether innovations in jury trial that have been introduced in the State juris-
dictions could be practised in federal jurisdiction.  
For example, can you separate the jury? If you go to the library at the Supreme 
Court in Melbourne, above the wonderful rotunda are the rooms where jurors who 
were trying a case were kept overnight. There were bunks there.  The conditions 
were, shall we say, pretty primitive.  But jurors were not separated. They could not 
leave the precincts of the court and the control of the Sheriff’s officer whilst they 
were conducting a trial.  This was because the accused had been placed ‘upon his 
country.’ The solemn responsibility of the jury (in many cases concerning the life 
and death of the prisoner) was to stay together.  In this way they would be com-
pletely immured from external influences, pressure, bribery, corruption or anything 
else. It was the rule of the time and absolutely strictly adhered to.  
The question arose in Brownlee’s case26 whether in today’s age, where jurors want 
to get home to their children and to their families, cook the dinner and get on with 
life, we would tolerate in federal trials what had been permitted in State jurisdic-
tions? Or whether that was forbidden by the constitutional words ‘by jury’ in Sec-
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tion 80? The High Court held that the verdict still had to be unanimous.  But that 
the jurors may separate. They don’t have to be kept together and remain locked up 
even whilst deliberating. The Court also held that there can be reserve jurors.  Trials 
now go on for much longer than typically they did in the 19th Century.  Many of the 
States have provisions for reserve jurors.  The question arose as to whether that 
could come within the little phrase ‘by jury’?27 The High Court held that juror 
separation and reserve jurors were within trial ‘by jury.’  But no to male qualifica-
tions and no to property rights.  
So what is the distinction which has informed the decision that ‘by jury’ picks up 
certain matters which were a phenomenon of 19th Century jury trial before the 
Australian Constitution was adopted, but not other matters which are a feature of 
jury trial in most parts of Australia today? Once again, an awful thought crossed my 
mind that the judges who had agreed to the separation of the juries and had agreed 
to allow women on juries and who had agreed that you didn’t have to have property 
rights to become a juror and agreed that juries could include reserve jurors where 
other jurors fell ill; perhaps they were ‘nominalists’ too? This would mean all 
members of the Court. It is a tantalising question, isn’t it, to consider whether we 
are all ‘nominalists’ now? And if so, in the immortal words of V.I Lenin, ‘What is 
to be done?’ 
V LIVING ON A LEGAL KNIFE’S EDGE 
 
The way in which we resolve these questions requires judicial technique and also a 
theory about the Australian Constitution. Not every case involves the Australian 
Constitution. We heard a case yesterday in the High Court which had three very 
intriguing points in it. One of them concerned whether it is a ‘reasonable excuse’ 
within the meaning of the criminal justice amendments in Western Australia, for 
police to agree to a suggested request by the accused to switch off the video re-
cording whilst the accused is making a statement to police.  During the period off 
camera the accused allegedly made what are said to be confessional statements that 
are damaging. Is it ‘reasonable excuse’ that the accused is alleged to have said, 
‘switch off the camera’?  Or, if that were accepted as a ‘reasonable excuse,’ would 
it drive a horse and cart through the purpose of the criminal law and procedures of 
Western Australia that oblige the video taping of confessions to police in those 
circumstances?  
There were two other very interesting points in the case. One of them concerned 
collateral evidence.  That is to say, when do you exceptionally permit collateral 
evidence to be received into evidence in a trial even though it is hearsay, and 
doesn’t prove the truth of the matter that is involved? The case involved a prisoner 
in custody who alleged that a person who gave evidence against the accused had 
confessed in prison to another prisoner, effectively, that he was going to ‘fit’ the 
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accused who was the appellant in our Court. The legal problem is a well known 
problem.  How do you draw the line, a line of principle, between permitting a 
person to give probative evidence, whilst not chasing every hare down its burrow?  
Courts don’t, as it were, look at every issue on the footing that what is said, even if 
proved, would merely prove that the person said something that would not neces-
sarily prove that it was true.  
As I was listening to this case, I leant over to Justice Callinan and I said ‘We have a 
very stressful life here, do you realise this? Every case has problems which are right 
at the cusp.’ ‘We are living,’ I said, trembling, to Justice Callinan ‘…we are living 
on a knife’s edge.  We have to decide about juries, about aliens, about collateral 
evidence, about ‘reasonable excuse’.  Every day is presenting us with really diffi-
cult questions. They may be questions of the Constitution.  They may be questions 
of statutory construction.  They may be questions to the common law.  But they are 
always on a knife’s edge. That is where we live.’ He smiled knowingly and we 
went back to the case. 
I’ve come along to this Justice Lecture today to tell you how difficult the life of a 
Justice of the High Court of Australia is.  I have done so in order that you will all 
appreciate how hard we have to work: how we give you our reasons at considerable 
length so that you will understand the working of our minds and see the considera-
tions which have led us to one result or another. It is in the very nature of the deci-
sions of the kind I have told you about, the considerations relating to the ‘marriage’ 
power if you like, or to the ‘aliens’ power, or to trial ‘by jury’ or to collateral evi-
dence or to the interpretation of a statute that talks of ‘reasonable excuse’. All such 
decisions are disputable.  For none of them is there an easy, simple solution.   
It is of the nature of the questions that we must resolve in the High Court of Austra-
lia that we don’t have an easy ride. There are no simple answers.  Certainly, by the 
time you get to the High Court of Australia, if it is a simple case, it ought not be 
there. And normally it doesn’t get there. That’s why simplistic notions about 
‘nominalists’ or ‘originalists’ have to be rejected by lawyers.  Such labels oversim-
plify the very function which the Australian Constitution gives to our judges.  
Moreover, they oversimplify the function that all of the judges perform and always 
have performed and always will perform, in defending the rule of law and seeking 
to uphold equal justice under law. 
What is new about our age is that there is much more candour on the part of judges 
concerning their performance and about the considerations that are taken into ac-
count.  About whether you take into account an idea of the function of a jury trial as 
required in the Australian Constitution.  About what the Australian Constitution is 
getting at by requiring that function. Does that notion of the function forbid the 
taking of a view that will allow the section of the Australian Constitution to be 
made worthless by a simple change of procedure (indictable or non indictable)? 
What is our Constitution there for? What is its purpose? Giving meaning to the 
words in the Australian Constitution according to the purpose of a living Constitu-
tion for a free people is the most important task that the High Court of Australia 
performs.  
 
